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Field Notes Nº 07 · October 2026

Trace Elements

a periodic table of the libraries under everything, and the people under them
kept by one or two peoplenobody made ten changes this yearthree or more+ added by copper.vision
33
libraries under phones, browsers and servers
20
kept by two people or fewer this year
2
median regular contributors per library, every year 2020 to 2025
418
years at the keyboard, nineteen maintainers combined

Every product your organization ships runs on code nobody on your payroll wrote. Thirty-three of those pieces sit under nearly every phone, browser and server on Earth. Twenty are kept by two people or fewer, the median has not risen above two in a decade while the devices depending on them tripled, and the people doing it have carried the work for decades around day jobs. This note lays them out as elements, shows which of them your products are compounds of, and names what holds each one up.

11 October 2026~18 min#open-source#supply-chain#maintainers

The original count of 23 libraries, their device inventory and funding notes are from The people holding up the internet by sheets.works, published with its data and script.12 This note re-ran their count on the code, extended it by ten libraries and thirty years, and gives the maintainers the credit the numbers imply.

00 · Why this version exists

A note before the note

I came across the sheets.works piece by way of a comment underneath it: hard to read, even for an experienced IT pro, but some great insights. That comment is the brief for this page. The original is a fine piece of counting, and it tells its story one maintainer at a time, which is how the people deserve to be told. It also assumes you already know what libxml2 is. Most of the people who sign off on software risk do not, and they are the ones who need the count.

The parallel I keep coming back to is the public library. A library lends one copy of a book to a whole town; a software library lends one piece of code to every program that asks. In both cases the borrower pays nothing at the counter, the collection has to be kept current by someone, and almost nobody who uses it knows the keeper's name. We fund the first kind as a public service because its value is spread across everyone and no single reader would pay for it alone. The second kind has the same economics and no tax base. It is kept, for the most part, by volunteers, and its borrowers number in the billions.

Where the parallel breaks is the scale of failure. A library that closes affects a town. One of these closing affects every phone at once. That is what load-bearing means here, and why the people in this note are listed as staff rather than as a warning. I re-ran the count on the code, added ten libraries the original did not cover, and traced the staffing back to 2000. Where my numbers differ from theirs, the page shows both.

David Sierra · October 2026
If you read nothing else
  1. Your products depend on 33 libraries you employ no one to maintain. Twenty are kept by two people or fewer; two had nobody make ten changes this year and still ship on billions of devices.
  2. This is not new and it is not getting better. Since 2000 the typical library has had two regular contributors. The average rose to five by 2015, almost all of it on four projects, and has been flat since, while the phones depending on them went from none to over four billion.
  3. The people are the asset. Nineteen of them have put about 418 years into this work, mostly unpaid, and when something broke they shipped the fix within days. If they all stopped tomorrow, nothing would break on day one and 24 of the 33 would have missed a release by day ninety, with no sign of it on your phone. Fund a second maintainer before the incident.
  1. 01What a library isand why these 33
  2. 02The tableelements and compounds
  3. 03The peoplea labor of love, by the year
  4. 04Twenty-six years, averagedhands, commits, load
  5. 05When an element failsand who fixed it
  6. 06What holds them upwhere the money went, and when
  7. 07If they all vanishedthe scenario, on the release calendar
  8. 08For the risk ownerthree rules, one checklist
  9. 09What this rests onand what would break it
  10. 10Method and limitshow it was counted
01

What a library is

and why these thirty-three

A library is a block of code that does one job well enough that thousands of other programs call it instead of writing their own. Open a JPEG. Compress a file. Check a certificate. Work out what time it is in Winnipeg. Your engineers add a line that calls the library, and the job is done. Libraries are how software gets built at all, and also where responsibility goes thin, because the people who call one rarely know who keeps it.

Take the time zone database. Every clock rule any government has ever announced lives in one text file, from wartime offsets in the 1940s to Manitoba's decision this year to stop changing its clocks. Every Android phone and every iPhone reads it, at least four billion devices before counting servers, Macs and laptops. The file is kept by Paul Eggert, a lecturer in computer science at UCLA, in his spare time, and has been since 2012. He made 218 of its 251 changes in the past year.15

"In case I am no longer available due to retirement or whatever."

Paul Eggert, asking the tz mailing list to make Tim Parenti his backup, 20 May 2020
A personal note

I have mythologized Paul Eggert's job for years. It is my favorite slightly spooky fact to hand to people: every clock on every phone you have ever owned takes its orders from one text file, kept by one lecturer in California in his spare time, and it has worked the whole time. My business partner has brought it up more than once after hearing it from me, which is the only measure I keep of how far an idea travels. Spreading that one warms my heart. The rest of this note is an attempt to turn that fact into a line item.

That is one library. sheets.works set out to measure the rest.1 They took 23 libraries that phones, browsers and servers depend on, downloaded each one's full history, and counted everyone who made ten or more changes in the year to 7 October 2026, leaving out merges and bots. Then they checked what is actually installed: the system libraries of an Android 16 image, Apple's iOS 26.2 developer kit, and Windows with the Edge browser it ships with. Each library ends up with two numbers. How many devices it is on, a floor. And how many hands are under it.

This note re-ran that count on the same code and got the same answer on 19 of the 22 projects it could reach; the other three differ by one person.3 It then added ten more libraries the original did not cover, counted the same way: the command-line tools inside every Android phone, the audio codec inside every voice call, the archive reader inside Windows, the C library inside most containers, and six others. None of the 33 is a random pick. Each is in the base image of an operating system or browser almost everyone uses, or in the standard toolkit of almost every server, which is what makes them load-bearing: a flaw or a gap in any one of them reaches billions of devices at once. Laid out by what they do, they look like this.

02

The table

elements and compounds

FIG 01The elements

Columns group the libraries by job. Each tile is one library. Tap a tile to read what it does, why it matters and who keeps it. Pick a compound to see which elements one everyday action is made of.

Compound

Reach is the floor that could be seen: Android 3.0 bn active devices (Google, 2022), iPhone 1.0 bn (Apple, 2021), Windows 1.6 bn monthly (Microsoft, 2026). n/c means not counted on those platforms, not unused: bash, sudo, OpenSSL, OpenSSH, musl, chrony and ncurses live on servers, containers and Macs, which the count leaves out. Compounds are a typical path through one action, drawn from the vendors' own source trees (see Method), not an inventory.2 The symbols are the author's, and Cu is deliberate; open that tile for the editor's note.

Data table for Fig 01
SymbolLibraryGroupDevices (bn)PlatformsRegular peopleRe-countAuthorsChangesTop authorTop shareFunding as recordedCounted by
6 of 10
libraries on 4 bn+ devices that are kept by two people or fewer
117 of 172
regular-contributor seats sit on five projects: FFmpeg, OpenSSL, BIND, libarchive, curl
55
regular contributors shared by the other twenty-eight libraries

Three things stand out once the 33 share one grammar.

The people cluster. Five projects hold 117 of the 172 regular-contributor seats. FFmpeg has 41, OpenSSL 35, BIND 16, libarchive 14 and curl 11. The other twenty-eight libraries, between them on every phone in the world, share 55 people.

The widest-shipping row is the thinnest. libxml2, zlib and SQLite are on all three platforms, at least 5.6 billion devices, with one, two and three regular contributors. libjpeg-turbo, which opens every JPEG on Android and in Chrome and Edge, is one developer who wrote 98% of its changes. libxslt, its sibling, is shipped in iOS and bundled in Chromium, and nobody made ten changes to it this year. Reach does not predict staffing: the rank correlation between devices and hands is about zero, and section 09 says what that rests on.

Your products are compounds. Pick "A Python script runs" above. One ordinary script touches seven of these elements, four of them kept by two people or fewer. A photo arriving in a chat on an Android phone passes through six. A deploy to a Linux server touches eleven.

03

The people

a labor of love, counted by the year

The count can read as an indictment. It reads better as a credit list. The people under these libraries have been doing the work for decades, most of them around a day job, and they are still shipping. Lasse Collin, whose project was the target of the most sophisticated supply-chain attack in open source history, removed the backdoor, audited the project and wrote 97% of the next year's changes. Thomas Dickey has released a patch to ncurses most weeks for thirty years. Mark Adler wrote the compression inside every PNG on Earth and, in his other job, got a rover to Mars.

FIG 02Years on the shelf

One book per year as maintainer or coordinator of the library, to 2026. Start years are from the projects' own histories; three are approximate and marked in the table.

418combined years, nineteen people. Most of it unpaid, most of it alongside other work.
Data table for Fig 02
PersonLibrarySinceYearsBasis

"It's also good to keep in mind that this is an unpaid hobby project."

Lasse Collin, xz mailing list, 8 June 2022. The hobby project ships in every iPhone.

Two of these people have asked, in public, for a sponsor. Todd Miller's note in February 2026 brought sudo an Open Collective budget of about $61,700 a year and thirty GitHub sponsors, the best funded one-person project in the count.15 Denis Pushkarev's appeal in 2019 raised $57 a month.14 Paul Eggert, Lasse Collin, DRC and Mark Adler do not have a sponsor page at all. The difference between those outcomes is not the importance of the work. It is who happened to hear about it.

04

Twenty-six years, averaged

hands, commits and load, 2000 to 2025

The count above is one year. The histories go back further, so this note asked the same question of every full year since 2000: how many people made ten or more changes to each library, how many changes there were, and who wrote most of them. Thirty-two of the 33 could be traced (bash publishes its history in batches, outside git). The averages are in Fig 03, and the shape is the point.

FIG 03The hands did not grow with the load

Each year, across every library that existed by then. Top: regular contributors per library, mean and median, with any one element overlaid. Middle: the share of libraries with two or fewer, and how much of the work the top author did. Bottom: active Android devices, as Google announced them, for scale.

Regular contributor = ten or more non-merge, non-bot changes in the calendar year, counted by author name in each project's public history. A library joins the average in the first year its history shows a change; the count of libraries in each year's average is printed above the top panel. Android device counts: Google I/O announcements of one, two, two and a half and three billion active devices, 2014, 2017, 2019 and 2021.23 2026 is excluded as a partial year.

Data table for Fig 03
YearLibrariesMean regularsMedian regularsShare with 2 or fewerMean top-author shareMean changes
2.1→4.8
mean regular contributors per library, 2000 to 2025. Flat since 2014.
2
median, in every year since 2015 but one. Never above 2.5 since 2000.
76%→64%
mean share of a library's changes written by its top author, 2000 to 2025

The average grew, then stopped. In 2000 the typical library here had two regular contributors and the average was just over two. By 2015 the average had reached five. It has not moved since: between 4.1 and 5.3 in every year from 2014 to 2025. Overlay OpenSSL and the reason is visible. Its bench went from six to fourteen in the Heartbleed year and then kept climbing to over thirty. Overlay FFmpeg, curl or BIND and you see the same thing on a longer curve. Those four projects are the growth.

The median did not move at all. Take the four away and the picture is a flat line at two. Overlay tz, xz, libjpeg-turbo, chrony, ncurses or libsodium: one or two people, every year, for as long as the history runs. The share of libraries with two or fewer regular contributors was 72% in 2000 and 56% in 2025, and most of that fall is the big four leaving the group, not the small ones gaining help.

Meanwhile the load went vertical. There were no Android phones in 2007. There were a billion by 2014, two billion by 2017 and three billion by 2021. Over the same years the median library under them gained nobody. Concentration eased slightly, from the top author writing three-quarters of the changes on average to about two-thirds, which is real but is again mostly the big four. For the typical element the person who wrote it in 2010 is still writing most of it.

05

When an element fails

three patterns, and who fixed each one

A thin project is not a broken one. Most of these have run for decades without incident. Thinness changes the shape of failure, and the public record sorts into three shapes. The bar in each row is the time between the weak point entering the code and someone finding it. The line under each row is what happened next, which is the part the famous stories tend to leave out.

FIG 04How long the weak point sat there

Hollow book: the weakness enters. Solid book: it is found, or the gap closes. Year axis 1985 to 2027, to scale.

weak point entersfound or resolved

Dates: Shellshock line committed 5 Aug 1989, disclosed 24 Sep 2014;10 Heartbleed code committed 31 Dec 2011, disclosed 7 Apr 2014;11 Log4Shell lookup shipped Sep 2013, disclosed 9 Dec 2021;13 first Jia Tan change to xz 28 Jan 2022, backdoor found 29 Mar 2024;78 core-js maintainer absent Jan to Oct 2020;14 tz lawsuit filed Sep 2011, dropped Feb 2012;6 libxml2 maintainer stepped down Sep 2025, handover Dec 2025.1

Data table for Fig 04
PatternIncidentLibraryEntersFound / resolvedSpanWhat happened next

Latent. A mistake sits in plain view because few people read the code closely. The line behind Shellshock went into bash in 1989 and was reported in 2014, on a project with one author. Heartbleed sat in OpenSSL for two years and then let anyone read memory from about 17% of trusted secure web servers.11 In both cases the maintainers had fixes out within days of the report.

Captured. A tired maintainer gives access to a helpful newcomer. In 2022 Lasse Collin was fielding mailing-list pressure about slow progress while a contributor called Jia Tan sent useful fixes. Jia Tan got commit access, out-committed Collin in 2023, and in February 2024 released versions carrying a backdoor into SSH logins on Linux servers. Andres Freund, an engineer at Microsoft, caught it on 29 March because his logins were using too much processor time, before it reached most Linux systems.78 Collin removed it and has run the project alone since. Nobody has identified Jia Tan.

Absent. The one person stops, for reasons that have nothing to do with code. core-js went nearly silent for ten months in 2020 while Denis Pushkarev served a prison sentence after a fatal car accident; downloads nearly doubled in the meantime, and he was back at work the month he was released.14 A 2011 lawsuit over the time zone database's historical entries took its site and mailing list offline until IANA took over hosting.6 libxml2's maintainer announced in September 2025 that he was stepping down and handed over in December; new maintainers were added within a day. That handover went well. The xz handover is what the same moment looks like when it does not. And libxslt, which lost the same maintainer in the same month, shows the quiet version: eight changes by three people in the year since, and 2.6 billion devices still shipping it.

06

What holds them up

where public money went, and when

Germany's Sovereign Tech Agency is the largest public funder of this kind of work, with 118 technologies supported since 2022.19 Five of the 33 hold its grants. Line those up against the libraries where no funding was found at all, and the order looks less like a map of load than a map of headlines.

FIG 05Grants against load

Bars: Sovereign Tech Agency grants, euros, to scale. Then libraries with other funding, then those where none was found. Each row ends with reach and regular contributors.

"None found" means nothing from the Sovereign Tech Agency, Alpha-Omega, Open Collective or GitHub Sponsors, checked by sheets.works for the original 23. For the ten added, the only check was the commit addresses, which is how the employer rows were found; the rest are marked not checked and left out of this figure, as are the six the original did not check.2

Data table for Fig 05
LibraryGroupPublic grantFunding as recordedDevices (bn)Regular people

The largest grant, €596,160, went to log4j, which the world met through Log4Shell in December 2021. OpenSSL holds the third largest. The six libraries with no funding found reach 5.6, 5.6, 4.6, 4.0, 1.0 and an uncounted number of billions of devices, and are carried by thirteen regular contributors between them. Two of the added elements show something the grant lists cannot: an employer. chrony's commits come from a Red Hat address and most of Opus's from a Google one, which is the arrangement that keeps a one-person library from being a one-person risk. Put the money and the incidents on one line and the order is hard to miss.

FIG 06Money and incidents on one line

One row per year. Left: incidents in this note's elements. Right: public money arriving, with the mark sized by amount on a log scale. Read down the page and watch which column moves first.

Grants from the Sovereign Tech Agency are placed at the midpoint of their stated investment years.19 The Core Infrastructure Initiative pledge is the Linux Foundation's May 2014 announcement.24 GnuPG's 2015 donations are as reported after press coverage of its one-person funding.25 The xz backdoor in March 2024 is the one incident on the line that brought no public money to the project involved.

Data table for Fig 06
WhenKindEventAmount

OpenSSL is the case where money did arrive, and it worked. In the week Heartbleed went public, the foundation's president wrote that it received about $2,000 a year in donations and had one person working on it full time.12 Within two months technology companies had pooled $5.4 million through the Linux Foundation, and OpenSSL got paid developers and an audit. Its bench has more than doubled since. xz had its own near miss ten years later.

FIG 07After the incident

Each book is one person making ten or more changes that year. OpenSSL before and after Heartbleed; xz before and after its backdoor.

Counted from the projects' public histories for this note; OpenSSL's 2013, 2014 and 2025 calendar years and xz's 2023, 2024 and 2025. In 2023 Collin and Jia Tan both cleared ten changes. No new public funding for xz was found after March 2024.

Data table for Fig 07
LibraryBeforeIncident yearAfter
OpenSSL6 (2013)14 (2014)32 (2025)
xz2 (2023)3 (2024)1 (2025)
07

If they all vanished

the thought experiment, run on the release calendar

Suppose every regular contributor in this table stopped tomorrow. Not a backdoor, not a bus: they simply never commit again. This is the scenario the comic is about, and it is worth running properly, because the intuition most people have about it is wrong in both directions. Nothing would break on day one. A great deal would be unfixable by day ninety.

Day one is uneventful because the code is already on the devices. A library is a book that has been lent out four billion times, and the librarian leaving does not recall the copies. Phones would ring, pages would load, logins would work. The absence only shows when the world asks for a change, and each project's release calendar says how soon that is. Fig 08 uses the typical gap between releases over the last three years as the clock: once a typical gap has passed, a release that would normally have shipped has not.

FIG 08The vanishing

Drag the months forward. A tile goes dark once a typical gap between that library's releases has passed without one. Tap a tile for its gap.

0
Tap a tile for its typical gap between releases.

Gap = median days between release tags, 7 October 2023 to 7 October 2026, from each repository's tags on 11 October 2026; same-day tags collapsed, pre-release tags excluded by name. bash's gap is from its two releases on gnu.org. libyaml has had no release since 2020 and a release candidate in April 2026, so it never darkens: it is already in this state. The consequence column is this note's judgment, by the kind of input each library handles.

Data table for Fig 08
SymbolLibraryReleases, 3 yrsPer yearTypical gap, daysKind of failure

Within a month, ten of the 33 have missed a release. Most of the misses are silent: ncurses' weekly patch, SQLite's point release, sudo's. Two are not. FFmpeg ships a fix every nine days on average and HarfBuzz every two weeks, because fuzzers find bugs in decoders constantly, and the first decoder bug found after the vanishing is a permanent way into every device that renders untrusted images, fonts or video, with no upstream fix coming.

Within three months, 24 have missed a release, and the time zone database is among them. Eleven releases in three years means that by its typical 77-day gap some government has changed its clocks and no phone has been told. Google and Apple would patch their own copies; they have the engineers. Nobody would be keeping the shared copy, so two phone makers could disagree about what time it is in a country, which has never happened and only has to happen once.

By the end of the first year, 29 of 33. The encryption and transfer layer stops moving at the moment it most needs to: the migration to post-quantum key exchange is under way in OpenSSL and OpenSSH now, browser vendors are shortening certificate lifetimes, and HTTP keeps gaining versions. Clients that cannot be updated start failing handshakes, or keep accepting what they should not. The three that would not miss a release for two years, zlib, musl and bash, are the reason this scenario is hard to see from outside: a library that ships once every two years looks identical whether it is well or abandoned.

Two things leave with the people that are harder to replace than code. The first is keys. Releases are signed, and distributions verify them against the maintainer's personal key; a new steward has to issue a new key and persuade every distribution to trust it, which is precisely the moment an attacker would choose, as the xz episode showed. The second is addresses. Five of the ten added elements are developed from the maintainer's own domain, as are tz's mailing list and xz's download site. A domain that is not renewed goes to whoever registers it next, and a dead project's download page in a stranger's hands is a supply-chain attack waiting for its first visitor.

What would not happen is data loss. PNG, JPEG, SQLite's file format, tar and gzip are documented and stable; the books stay readable. What is lost is the ability to change, and the people who knew why the code is the way it is.

What would have to happen, by horizon
Day 1
Breaks Nothing. Every device keeps running the copy it has.
To do Inventory. Match your software bill of materials to this table and find the elements you ship.
Week 2
Breaks ncurses, FFmpeg, HarfBuzz and sudo miss their first release. The first fuzzer-found decoder bug has no owner.
To do Freeze and fork. The platform vendors' security teams take ownership of their bundled copies; coordination moves to the distribution and oss-security lists that already exist.
Month 3
Breaks 24 of 33 have missed a release. A government changes its clocks and no phone is told. The decoder forks diverge.
To do Name stewards. IANA appoints a tz coordinator under RFC 6557, which already provides for it. Foundations adopt the orphans. New signing keys are issued and cross-signed, and every distribution updates its trust.
Year 1
Breaks 29 of 33. The crypto and transfer libraries fall behind the protocols; the post-quantum migration stalls; the first personal domain lapses at renewal.
To do Fund. Two engineers per element is about 66 people, roughly $16.5 million a year. A bus factor of three for anything on a billion devices.
Year 3
Breaks zlib, musl and bash finally miss one. New compilers and architectures ship without them; Alpine freezes; Python loses ctypes on new hardware.
To do Re-merge. Bring the diverged forks back to single upstreams, or accept permanent fragmentation. Write the rules in section 08 into procurement.

The repair bill is smaller than the scenario suggests. Two full-time engineers for each of the 33 elements is 66 people, roughly $16.5 million a year at a loaded cost of $250,000 each; that is copper.vision arithmetic, and the loaded-cost assumption is the whole estimate. The five Sovereign Tech Agency grants in Fig 05 total €1.83 million across four years, and the 2014 Core Infrastructure pledge was $5.4 million over three. Public grants to these 33 have never approached the repair figure in any year, and the scenario is already real for libxslt, which has had no regular contributor since its maintainer stepped down and still ships in every iPhone and every copy of Chrome.

08

For the risk owner

three rules and one checklist

None of this is an argument against using these libraries. There is no alternative to most of them, and the people keeping them are better at it than anyone you could hire to replace them. It is an argument for knowing which of your products are compounds of which elements, and for putting a small amount of money in front of the incident instead of a large amount behind it. Section 07 is the repair plan in reverse; this is the version you can start on Monday.

  • Put hands in the risk register. A software bill of materials lists components. Add two columns, regular contributors and top author's share, and flag anything at two or fewer that ships in your product. The data is public; this note's count of 32 histories ran in an afternoon.
  • Fund before the incident. OpenSSL got its people after Heartbleed. The six unfunded libraries in Fig 05 have not had theirs. A second maintainer costs a fraction of one incident response, and the Sovereign Tech Agency and Alpha-Omega both take applications from organizations that cannot apply as individuals.
  • Treat a handover as an event. The riskiest day in a thin project's life is the day someone new gets the keys, or nobody does. libxml2's handover went to known contributors in public, within a day. xz's went to a stranger who had spent two years earning trust. libxslt's went to no one. Watch for maintainer changes in your SBOM the way you watch for version changes.
Checklist · per library in your SBOM
FieldWhere it comes fromFlag when
Regular contributors, last 12 monthsgit log, authors with 10+ non-merge commits2 or fewer
Top author's sharesame logabove 80%
Trend, last five yearssame log, by calendar yearfalling, or flat at 1
Funding foundSTA, Alpha-Omega, Open Collective, GitHub Sponsors, project sitenone, with reach above 1 bn
Last maintainer changeMAINTAINERS file, release signer, mailing listwithin 12 months, or to an unknown name
Named backupproject governance page or list archivenone named
09

What this rests on

each claim, its evidence, and what would break it

Twenty of 33 libraries are kept by two people or fewer.

Rests on
A threshold of ten non-merge, non-bot changes in one year, counted by author name in each project's public history. For the original 23 the page uses sheets.works' figures; this note's re-count matched 19 of the 22 it could reach exactly and differed by one on curl, FreeType and OpenSSH, from how author names were merged.
Would break it
A lower threshold, or work that happens outside the public log. bash shows 17 changes because Chet Ramey publishes in batches. libxml2 and zlib each had more than 35 occasional authors; at a threshold of five, some would count. The two libraries with none, libxslt and libyaml, had eight and nine changes; a single active quarter would move them.
Likely robust. Lower thresholds add occasional contributors; they do not change who writes most of the code (top author's share in Fig 01).

The median library has had two regular contributors for a decade, while the average stopped growing in 2014.

Rests on
Per-year counts across 32 public histories (bash excluded), 2000 to 2025, from the clones made for this note on 11 October 2026. Ten of the 32 were chosen by copper.vision, so the set is not sheets.works' alone.
Would break it
A different set of libraries. Add twenty well-staffed foundation projects and the average rises; add twenty embedded parsers and it falls. GitHub mirrors that omit early history (zlib's begins in 2011, SQLite's in 2000) shorten some lines. Author-name splits inflate "authors" and can push a borderline person under ten.
Moderate for the level, strong for the shape. The flat median and the four-project growth survive any threshold between five and twenty; the exact mean does not.

How widely a library ships says nothing about how many people keep it.

Rests on
Device presence on Android 16, iOS 26.2 and Windows with Edge, against regular contributors. Spearman ρ = −0.12 across the original 23; −0.01 across the 14 seen on devices.
Would break it
Counting servers and Macs. That lifts OpenSSL, OpenSSH, bash and sudo to the top of reach. They would still split 35 contributors against 1, so the absence of a relationship survives; the ranking does not.
Moderate. With a hand-picked set, ρ near zero means no visible pattern, not proof of independence.

The ten added libraries are on the devices the page says they are.

Rests on
Vendor source trees: AOSP's external directory for toybox and Opus; Chromium's third_party directory for Opus and libxslt; Apple's iOS SDK library stubs for libxslt; Microsoft's announcements of tar and of 7z and rar support for libarchive.262728
Would break it
A library present in the tree but not shipped in the image. sheets.works read the compiled images; this note read the trees. If libxslt's stub is absent from the iOS 26.2 SDK, its reach falls from 2.6 to 1.6 billion.
Weaker than the original 23. Trees are a step removed from devices. The six added libraries marked n/c make no device claim at all.

Public money follows incidents more than load.

Rests on
Sovereign Tech Agency grants and their stated investment years, the 2014 Core Infrastructure Initiative, the 2015 GnuPG donations and the two public appeals, against the incident dates in Fig 04.
Would break it
Alpha-Omega grants and corporate employment, which the page does not itemize, flowing to the thin projects; or STA rationale documents that cite deployment rather than incidents. Six projects were not checked at all.
Weakest of the set. The pattern fits, but five grants is a small sample and employer-paid time is invisible here.

If the maintainers vanished, 24 of the 33 would miss a release within three months.

Rests on
The median gap between release tags in each repository over the three years to 7 October 2026, with same-day tags collapsed and pre-release tags excluded by name; bash from its two releases on gnu.org. A library "misses" a release once that gap has passed.
Would break it
Tag conventions. ncurses tags a weekly snapshot, which counts as a release here; libjpeg-turbo's repository carries tags for the reference JPEG code; a project that tags several branches on different days counts each. Gaps are medians, so an individual first miss could come sooner or later. The consequence column is judgment, not measurement.
Robust for the count, soft for the meaning. Which libraries release often is not in doubt; what a missed release costs is argued, not measured.

Nineteen maintainers have about 418 years between them.

Rests on
Start years from the projects' own histories, listed in Fig 02, counted to 2026.
Would break it
A stricter definition of "maintainer." Eggert contributed to tz for years before becoming coordinator in 2012; Miller's, Tsujikawa's and Lichvar's start years are approximate. The total could move by fifteen years either way.
Order of magnitude is safe. The exact figure is not, and the page says "about."
10

Method and limits

how it was counted, and by whom

Source of the original count. For the 23 libraries sheets.works counted, the regular-contributor, author and change figures in Fig 01 are theirs, re-read on 11 October 2026.2 Their window is 7 October 2025 to 7 October 2026; merges and bots are excluded; a person counts as a regular contributor with ten or more changes.

Re-count and extension. On 11 October 2026 copper.vision cloned the public history of 32 of the 33 libraries from GitHub (official repositories or mirrors; bash's mirror ends in 2017 and was not used), excluded merge commits and authors matching bot patterns, and counted by author name after normalizing case and accents. The same window reproduced sheets.works' regular-contributor count on 19 of 22 projects; curl, FreeType and OpenSSH differ by one. The ten added libraries were counted the same way. Per-year figures in Fig 03 and Fig 07 use calendar years. The script and per-project outputs are available on request.

Devices. For the original 23, a library counts on a platform only where sheets.works saw it in a compiled image or SDK. For the ten added, presence is taken from vendor source trees and announcements, which is weaker, and six of the ten make no device claim. Bases: Android over 3 billion active devices (Google, 2022), iPhone over 1 billion (Apple, 2021), Windows 1.6 billion monthly (Microsoft, 2026). Macs, iPads, servers, cars and TVs are left out, so every device number is a floor.

Compounds. Membership follows the vendors' own source trees: Chromium's third_party directory for the browser compound, the Android 16 and iOS 26.2 system libraries for the phone compounds, CPython's build dependencies for the script compound, Alpine's base image for the container compound, and the standard tooling of a Debian or Red Hat server for the deploy and login compounds. Each is a typical path, not an inventory.

Added here. The grouping into eleven columns, the element symbols, the compounds, the years-on-the-shelf count, the trend series, the money-and-incidents line and the rank correlations (Spearman, scipy, on sheets.works' 23 rows) are copper.vision's. Start years in Fig 02 come from the project histories cited; three are approximate and marked.

Release cadence (Fig 08). Release tags were read from the same repositories on 11 October 2026, all branches. A tag counts as a release if its name does not mark it as a candidate, alpha, beta, snapshot or similar; tags on the same day are collapsed to one; the typical gap is the median of the days between consecutive release days from 7 October 2023 to 7 October 2026. bash's gap is the interval between its 5.2 and 5.3 releases on gnu.org. The repair arithmetic in section 07 assumes two engineers per library at a loaded cost of $250,000 and is not a quote from anyone.

Discrepancies kept visible. OpenSSL shows 35 regular contributors in sheets.works' window, 36 in the re-count, and 32 in calendar 2025; the page labels each. The table records expat as "none found," but its maintainer has been funded by the City of Munich since August 2026; the page shows the Munich contract. SQLite is listed with four authors and three regular contributors. The GitHub mirror of zlib begins in 2011 and of SQLite in 2000, so their lines in Fig 03 start there.

Encoding. Dark green marks a counted quantity; in dark mode the fill is light grey on green. Red marks an incident. A dashed outline marks none. Color is never the only carrier: counts, outlines and labels repeat every distinction, and every figure has a data table.

Facts re-read 11 October 2026. Corrections will be listed here with dates. Report an error to optic@copper.vision, or reach the author through his name in the footer.

References
  1. sheets.works, "The people holding up the internet," Data Drop, October 2026. sheets.works
  2. sheets.works, 23-project table, dataset_v2.json. sheets.works
  3. copper.vision, re-count of 32 public histories cloned from GitHub, 11 October 2026; method in section 09. sheets.works' own script: build_data.py
  4. Randall Munroe, "Dependency," xkcd 2347. xkcd.com
  5. IETF, RFC 6557, Procedures for Maintaining the Time Zone Database, 2012. rfc-editor.org
  6. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Astrolabe v. Olson. eff.org
  7. Andres Freund, "backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise," oss-security, 29 March 2024. openwall.com
  8. Russ Cox, "Timeline of the xz open source attack," 2024. research.swtch.com
  9. NIST NVD, CVE-2024-3094. nvd.nist.gov
  10. David A. Wheeler, "Shellshock." dwheeler.com
  11. Netcraft, "Half a million widely trusted websites vulnerable to Heartbleed bug," 8 April 2014. netcraft.com
  12. Steve Marquess, "Of Money, Responsibility, and Pride," April 2014. veridicalsystems.com
  13. NIST NVD, CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). nvd.nist.gov
  14. Denis Pushkarev, "So, what's next?", core-js docs, 2023. github.com
  15. Todd C. Miller, sudo sponsorship note, February 2026. millert.dev
  16. SQLite, "Most Widely Deployed and Used Database Engine." sqlite.org
  17. libjpeg-turbo, project site and funding notes. libjpeg-turbo.org
  18. Daniel Stenberg, curl blog, including the 2025 review. daniel.haxx.se
  19. Sovereign Tech Agency, investments, with pages for curl, OpenSSH, Log4j, FFmpeg and the OpenSSL Foundation giving amounts and investment years. sovereign.tech
  20. NIST NVD, CVE-2023-4863 (libwebp). nvd.nist.gov
  21. Microsoft, "OpenSSH for Windows overview." learn.microsoft.com
  22. Sebastian Pipping, "libexpat now funded by the City of Munich," 4 August 2026, as reported by sheets.works.1
  23. Google, I/O keynote announcements of active Android devices: one billion (2014), two billion (2017), two and a half billion (2019), three billion (2021). blog.google
  24. Linux Foundation, "Core Infrastructure Initiative," announced May 2014 with $5.4 million in pledges over three years. linuxfoundation.org
  25. ProPublica, Julia Angwin, "The World's Email Encryption Software Relies on One Guy, Who is Going Broke," 5 February 2015, and its follow-up on the donations that arrived. propublica.org
  26. Android Open Source Project, external/toybox and external/libopus. android.googlesource.com
  27. Chromium, third_party directory, including libxslt and opus. chromium.googlesource.com
  28. Microsoft, "Tar and Curl Come to Windows!", December 2017, and Windows 11 native archive support built on libarchive, 2023. devblogs.microsoft.com